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What Is Visual Knowledge, and What Is It
Good for? Potential Ethnographic Lessons
from the Field of Legal Practice
Richard K. Sherwin, Neal Feigenson, and Christina Spiesel
A finn basis exists for an instructive exchange between anthropologists and legal
scholars regarding the production, dissemination, and interpretation of visual mean-
ing in this digital era. The practiceand theoryof law and anthropologytoday are
increasingly being shaped and informed by what appears on electronic screens-
in the field, the workplace, and inside the classroom. Practicing lawyers and ethno-
graphers need new tools of analysis and representation to meet the intellectual and
aesthetic demands of digital visual rhetoric. This article offers a multidisciplinary
approach to understanding the visual meaning-making process on the open source
borderland between disciplinary expertise and pop cultural communication.
VISUALS IN LAW AND ETHNOGRAPHY
This essay' is premised on the belief that a firm basis exists today for an instruc-
tive exchange between anthropologists and legal scholars regarding the pro-
duction, dissemination, and interpretation of visual meaning in the digital era.
In what follows, we want to emphasize a particular aspect of the integration of
visuals into the professional practices of law and ethnography. Like any com-
petent craftsperson, professionals in both fields are expected to understand
and, when appropriate, control the meaning-making features of the communi-
cation tools that they choose to deploy. Each tool has virtues and drawbacks,
and it is good to know what they are [Ruby 2000: 22; Elkins 2003: 97]. For
example, visuals tend to amplify affective content by generating clusters of
embodied associations in the mind of a viewer; as Murray-Brown points out;
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"The highest power of television journalism' is not in the transmission of infor-
mation but in the transmission of experience ... joy, sorrow, shock, fear, these
are the stuff of news" [1991:32]. Such associations will be triggered by a variety
of cognitive and experiential factors ranging from personal history to familiar
social scripts, recognizable character types, and other unconsciously assimilated
cultural referents and templates (which is to say, other forms of visual common
sense) [Geertz 1983: 85]. Associations will also be cued by internal resonances
that are set off by discrete filmmaking techniques-the shooting and editing pro-
cess itself. If you think you are constructing a logical argument when you are
really composing a poem or a musical score, which may be better analogues to
film composition [MacDougall 1998: 84; Tyler 1986: 1251,odds are you will be
in control of neither your medium nor your message.
The requirement of visual literacy and craftsmanship may seem to be rather
straightforward, but things are not that simple. Over the last few decades legal
scholars, like a good number of their anthropological counterparts, have been
struggling to work through a crisis of sorts regarding the nature and communic-
ability of truth [Pink 2001: 1; Shweder 1991: 591.This difficulty has been both
eased and exacerbated by the unprecedented control over descriptive reality that
digital communication technologies allow. The exquisite detail of a computer-
generated image can quickly convey complex data. At the same time, however,
computer technology has made it increasingly difficult to detect any discernible
difference between a digital simulation of an event and its nonvirtual reality. (In
some legal cases involving child pornography, for example, this difficulty has
made it almost impossible for prosecutors to shoulder their burden of proof that
the images in question are unlawful because real children were being used
[Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition 2002, United States of America v. David Hilton
2004, Weimann 2000: 330-335]). This issue goes to the heart of no less a matter
than what counts as legitimate knowledge, and what gets discounted as unac-
ceptable within a particular domain of professional fieldwork.
Once we step beyond this threshold matter, the next question is: How does a
discipline police its boundaries? For lawyers, this query is hardly academic.
Inside the courtroom, the difference between truth and falsity, fact and fantasy,
objectivity and subjectivity may be a matter of life and death.
Before proceeding further, a few preliminary remarks about lawyers as fact
gatherers, image users, and storytellers may be in order. We will then review
shared concerns and challenges that lawyers and ethnographers face when
visuals are incorporated into their respective professional practices. Next, we will
pursue in some detail how visuals and the impact of visual digital communi-
cation technologies in particular are changing what now passes for conventional
knowledge and practical skill sets in the contemporary practicing of ethnography
and law.
Lawyers, like ethnographers, are often called upon to gather a wide variety of
data from the field. Something has happened, a conflict has broken out, and now
a contest looms over what it all means. What is its legal significance? The facts
that lawyers seek and the tools they use to credibly convey the import and mean-
ing of the facts depend in significant part on a lawyer's working legal theory for
the particular case at hand. This means that at the outset the lawyer must identify
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in what sector of the law's territory the case is located. Do the facts invoke penal
laws, property laws or contract law? Or perhaps it will be a tort matter (which is
to say, a civil lawsuit involving claims of personal injury or damage to personal
property). Let's say the lawyer's client was injured in a car accident-a tort case.
In this instance, there is a good chance that the rules of negligence will corne into
play. If so, the fact narrative will have to focus on such matters as whether the
alleged wrongdoer's careless act caused the accident and ensuing harm or
whether other forces were at work-forces beyond the actor's control. If the latter
turns out to be the case, there would be no one to blame, and thus no basis to
compel the alleged wrongdoer to pay damages.
In addition to locating the case on the map of substantive law, the lawyer also
must consider a broad range of rhetorical moves. For example, is the narrative
meant to inform and guide the judgment of a particular judge or a jury? If the
former, there is likely to be a well-documented paper trail, the archive of that jud-
ge's prior decisions, which may be mined for ideological or idiosyncratic prefer-
ences. Each preference suggests ways to appeal to that particular judge's patterns
of thought, including his or her normative and aesthetic inclinations. Of course,
the lawyer may also choose a less strategically nuanced (or less self-reflexive)
path by simply presenting the applicable legal rules and principles as the lawyer
understands them. In any event, the fact narrative remains inescapably embed-
ded within a larger, professional ("disciplined") discourse.
Every trial conducted within the Anglo-American, adversarial common law
tradition involves competing reconstructions of reality. This means that each side
must cobble together a compelling narrative out of discrete evidentiary frag-
ments: eyewitness accounts, expert analyses of physical evidence, relevant docu-
mentation, and so on. In the end, lawyers will try to tell the most compelling
narrative that the trial evidence will support concerning what happened and
why. In order for outsiders (a juror, say, or a judge) to understand the persons
and events involved, context, character, and motivation must be carefully evoked
and construed. Along the way, numerous strategic decisions must be made:
Where should the story begin? How should it be sequenced? Who are the main
characters, and when should they be brought on stage? What genre and voice
should be used [Sherwin 1988: 551]? Careful consideration also must be given
to the audience: What role will they play? Should they be cast as detectives, help-
ing the lawyer to solve the mystery of the case ("who done it")? Or perhaps they
should be cast as heroes, joining in the lawyer's quest for justice [Sherwin 2004].
With so many narrative choices (where to begin, what to include, what to leave
out) the resulting text is anything but natural. This implicates the rhetorical (or
"constructivist") anxiety that underlies all cultural representation. As Clifford
Geertz puts it, "if the fact-configurations are not merely things found lying about
in the world and carried bodily into court, show-and-tell style, but close-edited
diagrams of reality the matching process itself produces, the whole thing looks
a bit like sleight-of-hand" [Geertz 1983: 1731.Of course, there are many ways
for narrative to fail: when the artifice shows through too plainly, or when the
generic frame lacks the power to make factual fragments cohere, or when the
story to be told lacks a familiar enough generic template to meet the expectations
an audience brings to the telling. In the face of defective narrative design, odds
I
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are that the audience's default sense of reality (their commonsense narrative
schemata for this kind of person/event) will prevail [Sherwin 1994: 39]. This
observation accords with James Clifford's disturbing account of Mashpee tribal
members who unsuccessfully sought to establish their authenticity as Native
Americans in a 1976 land claim suit. Ultimately the suit failed; the claimants in
court just didn't look and sound enough like "real Indians." The benchmark
for Mashpee identity had become too diffuse over long decades of cultural
assimilation and resistance. Clifford cuts to the crux of the dilemma when
he writes, "In the courtroom how could one give value to an undocumented 'tri-
bal' life largely invisible (or unheard) in the surviving record?" [Clifford 1988:
338-3391.
In litigation, the legal theory of the case determines the relevance and impor-
tance of facts. Similarly, by providing a benchmark for the innumerable decisions
about inclusion and exclusion that need to be made in ethnographic fieldwork,
theory also guides the search for cultural meaning-as Banks and Morphy point
out: "[Mjethod in anthropology has to be recognized as inherently theoretical in
its implications and it is today a requirement to make explicit these theoretical
underpinnings" [1997:13]. Of course, determining which theory should govern
under what circumstances is a matter of some internal controversy. This contro-
versy has been abetted by the introduction of visuals. So long as the function and
goals of visual communication remain uncertain in practice and inadequately
thought through in theory-which is to say, so long as professionals fail to
appreciate the discrete kinds of knowledge and meaning making that their visual
practices produce or invite-the greater the likelihood that rhetorical anxiety and
professional disquiet will persist. Visuals resist conventional (text-based) inter-
pretive coding. Their stubbornly open nature, what David MacDougall calls
the visual image's "connotative" as opposed to text's "denotative" quality, adds
uncertainty to the ethnographer's narrative choices [MacDougall 1998: 286].
Visuals also exhibit a tendency to privilege particular kinds of knowledge and
ways of knowing above others. Of particular note in this regard is the sensual
or embodied nature of visual knowledge [Pink 2006: 49]. The viewer tends to
respond affectively to the "flesh" of the visual image and its characteristic stimu-
lus toward associative or nonlinear thinking [Stoller 1997: 77].
In addition to these internal qualities of the visual, there are also external
uncertainties concerning the viewer's interpretive uptake. As Morphy and Banks
note, "One of the objectives of visual anthropology must be to reveal these differ-
ent 'ways of seeing' within and between societies and to show how they influ-
ence action in the world and people's conceptualizations of the world"
[1997: 22]. Visual rhetoric always raises questions of interpretive access, such
as: From whose point of view are we supposed to be viewing what we see on
the screen [MacDougall 1998: 771?The camera is placed here and not there; the
scene begins at this point and ends at that one; the editor places this scene or
image next to that one. How then are we to conclude that the end product
may properly be viewed as local knowledge as opposed to local knowledge fused
with professional ethnographic interpretation? And how are we supposed to
know which is which? In short, the familiar reflexivity issue is rhetorically ampli-
fied by the "sleight-of-hand" characteristic of realistic appearances on the screen.
, c"t, ~. p,







What Is Visual Knowledge, and What Is It Good for? 147
How does one facilitate a "local frame of awareness" [Geertz 1983: 6] when the
interpretive mediation-that informs the filmmaker's-c-or, for that matter, the
viewer's-i-Ipreconscious) visual commonsense operates substantially differently
from the meaning-making. frame that shapes' and' informs the indigenous
subject's local knowledge? As Jennifer Deger has brilliantlyshown, film can be
used to reflect the values" and, aesthetic concerns" of an indigenous cultural
imaginary [Deger 2007] ..When this occursr.visual images constitute a discrete
form of experience. To share this experience, one must open oneself up to the vis-
ual flow-just as one might immerse oneself in a musical or theatrical perform-
ance. In short, the phenomenology of perception operates as an antecedent to"a
more reflexive analytical process.: ".,," ::=}·H:·:.~~.,AC .,-:'". '. _ ,-<- " •
Of course there is something of a double bind at work here. Without at least a
threshold appreciation of what Deger calls the "cultural protocols" and "epis-
temological imperatives" of the visual display, the viewer may fail to experience
the work at all. On the other hand, set in too reflexive a posture; the critical
observer, intent on detached analysis, may remain foreclosed from experiencing
the mimetic reality that the visual may offer. To meet this interpretive challenge
requires an agile and informed interactivity. This involves a multimodal process
of immersion followed by critical analysis in which the viewer's 'own percep-
tions, affects, and perhaps even spiritual insights become part of the interpretive
process. Simply put, the visual teaches us to think with the body.v ,
Today we face new issues and new challenges associated with the rise of digi-
tal communication" and the proliferation of visual"mass media: Visual images
offer an immediacy of access to trained as well as untrained eyes. With the help
of visual images, previously hidden physical details may be brought into plain
sight: the way chemicals seeped into nearby ground-water, the way a defective
tail wing caused an airplane to crash, or how ammonia molecules were deliber-
ately used by cigarette manufacturers to deliver nicotine more effectively. Yet,
precisely because of their ease of access and credibility ("seeing is believing")
visual images introduce new challenges. Consider; for example, a 'criminal trial
in which a home video depicting police officers surrounding and beating a lone
civilian is digitally replotted to "demonstrate" how the civilian's movements
"caused" the police to beat him.' When the news televised George Holiday'S
images of a group of white Los Angeles police officersrepeatedly striking black
motorist Rodney King with their batons, public sympathy' for King was strong.
What could justify that kind of concerted violence against an unarmed civilian?
Indeed, the prosecutor in the state criminal case against the officers seemed to
echo this popular sentiment. "Just watch the Videotape," he repeatedly told the
jurors. But his trust in the simplicity of visual truth turned out to be misplaced.
Locked into his own naive realist perspective, the"prosecutor never 'paused to
consider the persuasive impact on the jurors of the defense's strategy. By digitiz-
ing Holliday's images, defense lawyers gained significant control over the rep-
resentation and renarratization of what the jurors saw on the screen at the
trial. By slowing down and isolating specific visual frames, the defense defused
the violence of the police blows [Feldman 1996; Goodwin 2001: 174-178]. Even
more importantly, however, by altering the sequential flow of the images, the
defense team managed to reverse causation in the jurors' minds. The premise
,11) 1,J \ ~
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was simple. Psychologists have long known that when we see two objects come
together and one immediately moves away our mind reads causation into the
scene. It looks as if one object caused the other to move. Similarly, when jurors
watched the digital version of George Holliday's videotape, first they saw
Rodney King's body rise off the ground (in direct violation of the officers'
instructions), then they saw the officers' batons come down on his body. When
King resumed the prone position, the police batons rose up again. And so the
pallern continued, with King rising up and batons coming down. In short, the
defense had effectively renarrated the scene to establish that King's own move-
ments had caused the batons to strike him. Instead of the prosecutor's story about
white, racist cops beating an innocent, black motorist, jurors now "saw" a series
of images in which police officers carefully (and professionally) "escalated and
deescalated" levels of force in direct response to King's aggressive resistance
of arrest.
Or consider the case in which a closing argument was presented in court
entirely on video. It was a civil dispute involving the largest accounting firm in
the world, Price Waterhouse. In arguing their case, the plaintiffs lawyers used
a visual montage showing a broad range of visual images, borrowing from both
documentary and feature film sources. The central image, however, remained the
same throughout. There on the screen was the unsinkable Titanic, the largest
ocean-going vessel in the world in its time. Why the Titanic? The plaintiff's case
theory was as simple as it was ingenious. Price Waterhouse had been hired to
investigate the financial standing of a bank that the plaintiff wanted to take over.
In the course of their analysis, however, Price Waterhouse made numerous
accounting errors, and their carelessness caused the plaintiff to unwillingly take
on massive unsecured loans. The upshot? Price Waterhouse might be the largest
accounting firm in the world-but, just like the Titanic, being the largest is no
guarantee against carelessness and disaster. That the plaintiffs' legal team indis-
criminately mingled documentary and feature film images of the Titanic and
its tragic fate left the trial judge unfazed. Defense objections at the trial were over-
ruled (though this ruling was later reversed on appeal) [Feldman 1996;Goodwin
2001: 174-178].
As electronic screens have proliferated, our minds have rapidly adapted. We
have learned to view multiple "windows" onto the real and the virtual simul-
taneously; we have come to accept simulations interspersed with real-life docu-
mentation; and we have willingly absorbed narratives with fragmented timelines
shaped by nonlinear ("associative") forms of logic that flaunt self-reflexive allu-
sions to the interpretive process of meaning-making itself. As Steven Johnson has
observed, video games, films, and popular television shows have grown more
complex over time [johnson 2005]. According to Johnson, consumers are drawn
specifically to those products that require the most mental engagement, from
small children who can't get enough of their favorite Disney DVDs to adults
who find new layers of meaning with each repeated viewing of the comedy tele-
vision series Seinfeld. Indeed, increasingly sophisticated viewing habits are
required to make sense of the multiple networks of characters and subplots that
are commonly featured on popular television shows. Fast-moving, interactive
video games require increasingly sophisticated adaptive responses to
,~ I , I -, ~~I ('I "
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problem-solving, Similarly, a discrete cognitive acuity is also required to appreci-
ate such films as Quentin Tarantino's' Pulp Fiction [1994], a work that invites
viewers to develop not only cognitive associations that connect its nonlinear
(starkly nonchronological) sequence of scenes, but also external associations to
other films that add layers of meaning to the screen experience. In short, human
perception and cognition are rapidly adapting to the nature and demands of new
communication technologies: _ ~ ,-;. \ " . - .
As a matter of everyday practice, in courtrooms across America legal and non-
legal realities are being projected visually in a variety of ways inside the court-
room-from "day in the life" documentaries in' personal injury lawsuits to
reality-based police surveillance 'and security videos, amateur and news journal-
ist videos (together with their digitized reconstruction), computer graphics and
digitally reconstructed accidents and crime reenactments,' and video montage
as a form of legal argumentation (including the interweaving of documentary
and feature-film images, as occurred, in the "Titanic" closing argument).. The
blurring of Hollywood fictions and legal reality is also occurring inthe stories
trial lawyers tell, Consider the prosecutors in real homicide cases who compare
the accused to film characters from Francis Ford Coppola's The Godfather or Oli-
ver Stone's Natural Born Killers; or the state's attorney who establishes a "know-
ing and voluntary" waiver of' "Miranda, rights" based on the defendant's
familiarity with a popular TV sh~w [Kemple 1995:1].' '. ':', ''':: ',..,,.
For decades now it has been generally understood in'the realm of the human
sciences [Ricoeur 1981:49] that interpretations of truth and falsity and judgments
of liability and guilt are socially constructed and, to a significant degree, cultu-
rally contingent [Black 1962;Ricoeur1981: 43].'Many other disciplines-s-includ-
ing the philosophy of science' [Latour'1999]" the philosophy' of language
[Austin 1962;Wittgenstein 1958], and linguistics [Sweetser 1990]-'-aI50recognize
that meaning depends on context and that truth depends on the ways in which it
is represented. Indeed, new studies of the physiology of perception indicate that
even Our most basic contacts with' reality are socially mediated and constructed
[Berns et al. 2005]. In short, across many disciplines, scholars have sought to
explain how knowledge is locally constructed: through culturally embedded
practices IGeertz 1983; Latour 1987; Latour and Woolgar 1987; Shweder 1991],
and through diverse techniques of investigation and representation [Galison
1997;Hacking 1983].So too in Anglo-American legal studies, many have recog-
nized that legal meaning is produced by the ways law is practiced [Llewellyn
1960],and that rhetoric in its many guises is constitutive of, not opposed to, truth
[Sherwin 1988, 1994]. , .. "'-'
Nevertheless, the cultural shift from an objectivist to a constructivist approach
to human knowledge has not been anxiety-free [Bernstein 1985]: Many parti-
cipants in and observers of the legal system in particular continue to experience
uneasiness with the semioticians' wisdom that "it's all signs" [Sebeok 1994].
Their fear seems to be that embracing this constructivist insight would undercut
confidence in the capacity of legal proceedings (paradigmatically, trials) to yield
provable truths about the world [Burns 1999;Nesson 1985].An unbridgeable gap
between what legal decision-makers believe they need to know' and what, on
reflection, they seem able to know is for many a cause for real concern. Within
� ~\ L . i; r)\ r;' ,~ " .,
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this late modern' (or postmodem) 'mindset, there is a heightened sense of inhabit-
ing a universe of representations that seems to turn the urge for real-world
knowledge back upon itself, as if in an endless regression, like some spectacular
baroque tapestry or infinite arabesque endlessly folding in on itself [Sherwin
2005: 126; Wolfflin 1964: 34; Deleuze 1993: 3]. The notion that we live in a
universe of endless representations is experienced by some not as a source of
anxiety but as an opportunity for freedom and self-realization, As Flusser
observes, "What the cultural revolution now under way is all about is that we
have gained the ability to set alternative worlds alongside the one taken by us
as given" [Flusser 1999: 65]. Lifton characterizes the shift toward fluidity and
many-sidedness as an unconscious adaptation "to the restlessness and flux of
our time" [Lifton 1999: 1].
This vertiginous sense of a lack of grounding has intensified in the digital age.
Digital technologies allow the pictures and words from which meanings are com-
posed to be seamlessly modified and recombined in any fashion whatsoever,
while the Internet allows practically anyone, anywhere, to disseminate meanings
just about everywhere, The Enlightenment-era insistence on essentialist founda-
tions (whether exemplified by Locke's empiricism, Kant's rational categories, or
other totalizing epistemologies) is being challenged by digital experience, which
has helped to inspire an alternative model of knowledge and reality as a center-
less and constantly morphing network of relations [Rorty 2004].
The task lawyers and, we venture to add, anthropologists face is to make sense
of their respective practices in this nonessentialist, screen-dominated, and per-
vasively visual digital era. How are we to make peace with a rhetorical, construe-
tivist approach to truth that tells us that representations can thoroughly mediate
knowledge without seeming to dissolve that knowledge into mere adversarial
contentions? (The split between "true" knowledge-as the product of universal
reason or essentialist categories-and "mere" eloquence-as the historically
contingent offshoot of the art of persuasion or digital aesthetics-recapitulates
the perennial quarrel between ancients and moderns, which is to say, between
the scientific rationality of philosophical dialectics and the techne or craft of rhet-
oric [Struever 1970:5-39; Goodrich 1987;97; Smith 1988: 183].)
Securing this realization makes way for the next query, one that typifies a more
self-reflexively constitutive outlook: namely, what kinds of knowledge and
meaning are created, and with what outcomes, when they are visually and digi-
tally constructed in particular ways [White 1984: 266]?
Many practicing lawyers are already deeply engaged by these questions. They
have to be. Lawyers know that winning cases means persuading their audiences
to believe in their stories of what happened and their understandings of the legal
significance of particular events and actions. They also know that to be success-
ful they must understand the tools of communication at their (and their adver-
saries') disposal-in particular, the visual and multimedia tools that digital
technologies provide. In short, trial lawyers, in order to be effective, must com-
prehend the effects that their rhetorical tools can have on audiences' perceptions,
thoughts, and emotions. Law teachers, on the other hand, are only gradually
catching on to the range of implications flowing from the ensuing changes in
mind, culture, and technology [Courtroom 21 Project, http://www.wm.eduj
" 1'"1
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law /courtroom21/; Hirsh and Miller 2004]. Legal theorists too have been slow
to grapple in a focused and systematic way with the new realities of law in
the digital age.
In what follows, aside from simply flagging these epistemological issues, we
would like to illustrate how they arise in legal practice.
Consider, for example, SOJl1escenes from contemporary legal practice.
• In a recent class action suit against some of the world's largest tobacco compa-
nies, the plaintiffs' lawyers contended that the defendant companies were
being deceitful when they denied knowledge of the addicting properties of
nicotine. At the trial a simple computer simulation demonstrated how
ammonia molecules had been added to cigarettes for the sole purpose of facil-
itating the rapid intake of nicotine. The color-coded images made plain that the
tobacco companies had designed their product as a maximally efficient
nicotine delivery system [Figures 1 and 2].
• In its highly publicized 2002 prosecution of Michael Skakel for the 1975 murder
of Martha Moxley, lawyers for the State of Connecticut used an interactive CO-
RaM to display all of their demonstrative evidence throughout the trial,
including photographs of the neighborhood and crime scene, diagrams of
the locations at which real evidence had been found, and an audiotape of a
telephone interview Skakel had given to a journalist in the late 1990s. During
the closing argument, the prosecution replayed excerpts from the audiotape
and simultaneously projected a transcript of Skakel's words onto a screen for
jurors to follow. In the closing's most dramatic moment, jurors heard Skakel
describe the panic he felt when Martha's mother asked him about her daughter
the morning after the night of the murder-s-and simultaneously saw on the
screen a photograph of Martha's lifeless body next to the transcript of Skakcl's
words [Connecticut v. Sknkel] 2002; Carney and Feigenson 2004].
• Foran insider trading case against the investment finn Kidder, Peabody and its
former executive and corporate takeover wizard Martin Siegel, lawyers for the
plaintiff Maxus Corporation (which eventually purchased the target company)
Figure 1 Color-coded grnphic (reproduced here in black and white) IIsed ill IitignlioJl agnil/sf
tobncco conuxuiies, showillg mnmonie molecule fncifitatillS delivery of nicotine ill a cignrette (conr-
les!! of LVS).
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Figure 2 Graphic in tobacco litigation showing jurors how nicotine is absorbed ill bindillg sites ill
the brain (courtesy of LVS).
prepared a closing argument video that incorporated animated graphics,
archival photographs, excerpts from videotaped depositions, and other materi-
als to show that Siegel had conspired with Ivan Boesky to drive up the target's
stock price. Siegel's repeated refusal to testify at his depositions-he took the
Fifth Amendment more than 600 times-was captured by nine sequential clips
of Siegel looking down at a prepared text. As one clip followed another on the
screen, they assumed the shape of a three-by-three grid reminiscent of the
popular TV game show 'The Hollywood Squares." When the grid was com-
plete, the audience both saw and heard the simultaneous Siegels is turning
the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify into a self-protective mantra
[Figure 3; Stachenfeld and Nicholson 1996; Eichenwad 1992J.
Lawyers, as rhetoricians, have always known that effective persuasion requires
speaking in terms their audiences understand. And they are now adapting to a
culture in which audiences are accustomed by their everyday work and leisure
experiences with television, movies, print media, and computers to rely on vis-
ual-as well as audio and print-based-inforrnation. Adding to their traditional
- .. t,It :l~--- ~... ,(; 1\\\ \\--- --...--
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Figure 3 Graphic from insider trading case associating defendant's exercise of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege agaillst compelled self-iI/crimination with a popniar TV gamc show (courtesy of
LVS).
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"demonstrative arsenal of maps, diagrams, models, and 'photographs, lawyers
(and the litigation' consultants who assist them) are now introducing new
kinds of visualand multimedia display, They assemble video previews of the
strengths of their"cases and show them to opposing counsel in the hope of obtain-
ing favorable settlements [Tarantino" 2004; Buckley 1986], They" shoot and edit
"day-in-the-life" movies of accident victims for personal injury cases [Joseph
1997: §4,06;Buckley 1986], and compile video montages of murder victims' lives
to be used as victim-impact evidence in sentencing proceedings [Hicks v, Arkansas
1997; Salazar v, Texas 2002]; Software programs like Sanction and Trial Director
enable them to replay video depositions for judge and jury and simultaneously
to display deponents' words on a scrolling transcript [Verdict Systems LLC, Sanc-
tion CD-ROM; lndata Corporation; Trial Director CD-ROM]. Advocates digitally
enhance photographs and create Photoshop overlays of different forensic images
[Stale v, Swinton 2004], They use computer animations to illustrate expert witness
reconstructions of crimes' and accidents [Joseph 1997: §§ 8.01-8,061; To set the
scene for eyewitness testimony, they can use "virtual reality views" -;;eamless,
360-degree representations of a scene, composited from "digital photographs, with
which witnesses can interact, moving in any direction and zooming in or out as
desired [Barnell 2004: 693-694; Whelan, 2005], And to build opening statements
and closing arguments around multimedia displays that integrate text, photos,
video clips, original graphics; and sound files, lawyers need not rely on the sorts
of sophisticated consultants who produced the arguments in the three case exam-
ples above. They can do it themselves with PowerPoint [Siemer and Rothschild
2002]. ("} I~ \",\.(;. ~:: ;h.;-;::_'. '.".-":-:" __....,,1-', >~:-.:_..;(:,',' .. , .')..'~.:;~-;.
The ongoing transformation of law practice by digital visual and multimedia
technologies can be gauged in part by the growing numbers of high-tech court-
rooms [WiggIns 2004]' and instructional materials for lawyers [Arkfeld 2001;
Brenden and Goodhue 2001; Ritter 2004]. But even more importantly; the pro-
liferation of digital and visual tools is profoundly changing the" 'way litigators
approach their jobs. First, the ability to put so much of their thinking into visual
form leads lawyers to "brainstorm" and strategize their cases differently. When
lawyers visualize a case; different possible relationships between elements can
emerge that remain invisible when those same elements are only described ver-
bally. This 'is: because visual spatial arrangements are different from linear
linguistic sequences> (Consider this the visual "equivalent of the claim that we
often discover what we are thinking in the act of writing.) For exarriple, one
can talk about information" channels in a complex corporate hierarchy, but a
box-and-line chart showing who communicated with whom can make instantly
intelligible the paths of information and of influence: Second, the process of
assembling and designing the visual presentations to be shown during negotia-
tions, arbitration proceedings, or trials forces lawyers to prepare their cases ear-
lier and more thoroughly than they would otherwise. Advocates must think
through their theories of the case up front so that they' can" plan for, design,
and integrate apt visuals at the right spots in their presentations, Third, as scien-
tific and other complex evidence plays an ever-larger role in legal disputes, the
move to the "visual enables lawyers and their expert witnesses to teach their cases
more effectively to judges arid juries. By using pictures as well as words, lawyers
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can present their cases in ways that interact more effectively with thejr audiences'
diverse styles of learning [Mayer 1989;Mayer and Anderson 1992;Gardner 1993].
This enhanced capacity for visual representation fosters in practitioners a mind-
set of "lawyer-as-instructor" that may, over time, effectively compete with the
more pejorative popular images of the lawyer as "hired gun" and unethical
manipulator, (Of course, new digital communication technologies also open up
new opportunities for questionable practices, which need to be understood and
effectively countered.)
These developments make it incumbent upon us to ask: How and what exactly
do juries and judges learn when lawyers use digital and visual media to present
evidence and argument? And how does the shift to these media affect the way
that lawyers and their audiences reconstruct reality for the purpose of rendering
legal judgment?
Today, it is well accepted that our sense of history, like our sense of memory
and self-identity, is in large measure the result of composing and telling stories
[Sherwin 1996; Amsterdam and Bruner 2000; McAdams 1993; Sarbin 1986;
Schafer 1992; Spence 1982]. And just as it is through stories that we construct
the meaning of individual and collective experience, so also is it through stories
that we are moved to blame or exonerate others [Pennington and Hastie 1993J.To
an increasing extent, storytelling in popular culture today is visual. Digital pic-
tures-conveyed through television, movies, videos, CD-ROM, DVD, the Inter-
net, and traditional print media-have come to dominate our entertainments,
our politics, our news, and our methods of education, and now they are infusing
law practice as well. In fact, pictures have come to be seen by some as more real
than technologically unmediated reality [Baudrillard 1900, 1995]. It should not
prove surprising, then, that it is the play of pictures invoking other pictures
(together with other, more implicit meanings) that we see when lawyers recon-
struct reality visually in the courtroom [Meyer 1994;Sherwin 2000].
We offer below four sets of interdisciplinary insights into law's visual and
digital meaning-making practices today. This illustrative (but hardly exhaustive)
set of tools includes the neurobiology and psychology of vision; cognitive
psychology and narrative theory; media studies and reality judgments; and the
cultural psychology of digital experience. No one tool or insight explains every-
thing, but each advances the understanding of how advocates and their audi-
ences make meanings. Taken together, these multiple tools and insights from a
variety of disciplines establish a network of overlapping and mutually informa-
tive methods of· analysis. and persuasion. This network constitutes the more
expansive domain of rhetoric in the digital age. Singly and jointly applied, these
rhetorical tools advance the advocate's twin goals of credibly representing reality
while persuasively activating decision-makers' memories, emotions, and beliefs
in their pursuit of judgment.
1. Vision Science and Visual Thinking: Why Pictures Matter
When judges and jurors scrutinize photographs, videos, computer animations,
and other graphic materials (such as charts, graphs, and maps) used as demonstrative
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evidence as they strive to reach decisions, they are doing something very
different from what they are doing when they listen to testimony or read docu-
ments: When they look at pictures, they are reading a different kind of text,
which comes with its own methods of decoding, historyfies), and ways of resonat-
ing with the rest of our culture. To appreciate how profoundly the visual turn is
affecting law, therefore, it is necessary to understand a bit about vision and visu-
ality-what is distinctive about visual perception and visual thinking, and why
visual displays can exert an especially strong influence on legal judgment.
Let us begin with the biology and neuropsychology of vision. In spite of the
apparently seamless unfolding of the external world through visual perception,
people actually construct their ideas about the world through discrete bits of
information that they assemble into visual images. With a speed that makes
the process seem automatic, people arrive at a conscious sense of continuous per-
ceptions. But that is not the way things are before the brain composes the coher-
ence of perceived reality [Barry 1997; Hoffman 1998; Finkel 1992], To make order
out of what might otherwise be a chaos of perceptions, people resort to rapid
sortings of data, marking their relative importance so that they may rely on their
perceptions to make quick judgments. This capacity to sort perceptions and regis-
ter their emotional significance rapidly allows people to know when to fight and
when to flee [LeDoux 1996], when they need to pay focused attention, and when
they can afford to be lost in mental clouds. At least some of the emotional associa-
tions that a visual perception acquires attach well before anything like conscious
processing occurs, which can lead to stereotyped thinking that goes unnoticed by
the rationalizing cortex [Dovidio and Gaertner 1993: 167; Fiske 1998: 357).
Visualization and visual thinking are quick; they are also highly malleable.
Basic perceptual judgments are prone to social influence; for example, people
are more likely to see two similar objects as the same if told that others have seen
them that way [Berns et al. 2005). Verbal information can remold visual interpret-
ation and memories. In one well-known experiment, participants shown a film of
an automobile accident who were asked how fast the cars were going when they
"smashed into" one another gave higher estimates of speed than participants
who saw the identical film but were asked how fast the cars were going when
they "collided with" one another-and, one week later, were more likely to recall
having seen broken glass in the film, even though none was actually present [Lof-
tus and Palmer 1974). Captions guide the interpretation of pictures [palmer 1999:
597--601; Slattery 1990), and suggestive questioning can induce not merely biased
but entirely false visual memories [Lindsay 1999).
Visual thinking is malleable because the images that people think with "are not
stored as facsimile pictures of things, or events, or words, or sentences" [Damasio
1994). There is no one place in the brain in which internal representations of vis-
ual percepts or mental imagery "come together" [Finkel 1992). When people
need to think imagistically in response: to a given task, they do not simply
retrieve intact the appropriate images from their neurological library. Conse-
quently, the beliefs and judgments that people may articulate in response to tasks
eliciting visual thinking are not simple read-offs from some internal visual or
quasi-visual mental reality [Bennett and Hacker 2003; Wittgenstein 1958: 154,
180], any more than their beliefs and judgments about the world in general are
j,
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simply read-offs from external reality. Rather, people (re)construct the mental
images they use in their thinking as required by the task and the situation
[Churchland 2002: 309, 318]. A more apt metaphor for the mind than a library
(or some equivalent "container") might be that of a short-order cook-and not
one who dishes up just ham and eggs, but an artful French chef who can nearly
instantly combine neural ingredients to create a sumptuous repast to order
[Marks 1990: 1,6]. Perceiving and imaging are not merely processes of identifi-
cation brought about by looking and listening but active performances in which
specific intentions, purposes, and actions need to be fulfilled [Gibson 1979:253J.
In the light of these features of visual perception and thinking, consider some
of the ways in which pictures, in contrast to purely verbal communications, can
affect legal decision-makers' thinking and judgments (for a more detailed dis-
cussion, see [Sherwin 2004: 95, 99-100]):
• Pictures of all kinds--still or moving, diagrammatic or photo-realistic-tend to
have a greater impact than nonvisual expressions of the "same" information,
because pictures tend to be more vivid. The greater salience of visual infor-
mation makes it more likely that the viewer will take in the information,
remember it, and use it in subsequent judgment tasks [Bell and Loftus 1985;
Martin and Williams 1990].
• Visual displays can convey more information than words alone and enable
viewers to understand more. For example, spatial arrays, graphs, and dia-
grams can show relationships between data that would remain obscure if
the data remained in tabular notational form [Kosslyn 1994a; Tufte 1983,
1990, 1997]. Similarly, computer-animated reconstructions of events can rep-
resent with clarity and precision small but legally significant changes within
a given period (such as the relative positions and speeds of vehicles prior to
a collision [Dunn et al. 2006; Kassin and Dunn 1997]). These factual details
might remain difficult for a decision-maker to imagine, and thus harder to
understand, if left to verbal descriptions alone. (Some research has shown that
computer animations may not assist legal decision-making where audiences
are able to visualize events adequately on the basis of verbal information
and nonmoving diagrams alone [Dunn 2001; Bennett, Leibman, and Fetter
1999].)
• Photo-realistic pictures tend to arouse cognitive and emotional responses simi-
lar to those aroused by the real thing. For example, an IMAXmovie of a roller-
coaster ride can induce vertigo in viewers who would remain unruffled by a
verbal description [Gunning 1995,Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff 1997].
• Unlike words, which are obviously constructed by the speaker and thus are
understood to be at one remove from the reality they describe, photo-realistic
photographs, videos, and film can appear to be caused by the external world
(sometimes referred to as indexicalitu) without the taint of human mediation
or authorial interpretation [Mnookin 1998:16--17].Consequently, they tend to
be accepted as highly credible evidence of the reality they depict, even though
they lack the other sensory modalities that the viewer would encounter in real
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• Unlike the linear communication of words, which must be taken in sequen-
tially, much of a still picture's meaning can be grasped all at once. It takes a
lot less time and mental effort to see a picture than to read a thousand words
[Kosslyn ,1994: 10]. This allows decision-makers to take in more information
and to develop a beller understanding of the case-or at least to feel that they
have done so. (What viewers tend to take in rapidly is the organization of the
whole and the meaning associated at that level. By getling the Gestalt, viewers
may feel that they have understood what they need to know, even though they
have not bothered to explore the relations between all the parts of the picture.)
• When people take in photo-realistic pictures, they tend to believe that they
have got all there is to get. Consequently, they are disinclined to pursue the
matter further. This sense of communicative efficacy is even stronger in lime-
based media such as film, video, and computer animation, which offer the eye
rapid visual sequences. These tend to disable crilicalthinking, because viewers
are too busy attending to the picture immediately before their eyes to reflect on
those that have gone before [Barry 1997: 32, 46; Shapiro and McDonald 1992:
108].As a result, compared to words, visual communications tend to generate less
counter-argument and hence more confidence in the judgments they support.
• When pictures are used to communicate propositional claims, at least some of
their meaning always remains implicit. Pictures cannot be reduced to explicit
verbal propositions [Elkins 1999: 68-74]. In this respect, pictures are well suited
to leaving intended meanings unspoken, as would-be persuaders may prefer
to do---especially when evidentiary rules or social conventions forbid making
a given claim explicitly. (Visual displays can do this much better than words
precisely because, not being themselves prepositional, less of what they mean
is anchored in what they "say.")
• Finally, pictures, more so than words, convey meaning through associational
logic that operates in large part subconsciously, through its emotional appeal
[Martin and Williams 1990: 268]. Thus a person may be aware that a picture
is strongly linked toan emotional response without knowing or understanding
what the connection is [Andersen 1995: 72-85; LeDoux 1996: 71], And when the
emotional underpinnings of judgment remain outside awareness, they are less
susceptible to effective critique and counter-argument. (Several psychologists
and philosophers have recently emphasized that intuitive emotional responses
tend to drive people's moral (and legal) judgments, in part because people's
later conscious cognitive processing tends to rationalize decisions already
reached rather than to subject them to truly critical scrutiny [Haidt 2001: 814;
2003: 197].) .
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Now let us consider some illustrations of how skillful advocates take advan-
tage of these attributes of visual communication to help their audiences recon-
struct reality. Recall the class action suit against the big tobacco companies to
which we alluded' earlier. How better to convince jurors that the defendants
wanted to keep their customers "hooked" on tobacco than to show how the
addiction process actually works? That is precisely what the plaintiffs' eviden-
tiary graphic did. Images of vividly colored ammonia molecules closely interact-
ing with nicotine inside a cigarette made the product engineering process clear.
158 R. K. Sherwin et al.
",_ fl"'-'" ,
Subsequent images of key "nicotine binding sites" in the brain completed the
picture. Taken together, these instructive, easy-to-grasp, and highly memorable
visual displays quickly and effortlessly conveyed complex technical information
that went to the heart of the plaintiffs' claim. The defendants' denials were
groundless; their product, in essence a highly efficient nicotine delivery system,
was manifestly designed to induce addiction-just as the plaintiffs' trial experts
said. Having now seen for themselves the defendants' product in action, what
more could the jurors want? Words alone could hardly offset the immediate
and enduring impact that this kind of visual persuasion exerts on decision-
makers' thinking and judgment.
Or consider again the criminal case that we introduced earlier on. During the
State of Connecticut's closing argument in the trial ofMichael Skakel for the mur-
der, 27 years before, of IS-year-old Martha Moxley, jurors heard and saw Skakel's
own words appear on the screen before them. As Skakel uttered the word
"panic," jurors instantly saw Martha Moxley's lifeless body appear on the screen
as it lay at the crime scene. Of course Skakel experienced a "feeling of panic"
when Martha's mother asked him the next morning if he had seen Martha the
night before. The picture of Martha's battered, lifeless body immediately explains
the implicit meaning of his words. The viewer instantly makes the connection:
Skakel, upon awakening, must have recalled with horror what he had done
the night before. Because the screen-based emotional response and the reality-
based response are comparable, the viewer's emotional reaction to the picture
of Moxley's body is readily transferred to Skakel. The viewer "knows" what
he is reacting to. And the viewer's revulsion at what Skakel had done readily
casts an image of guilt in the viewer's mind. This instantaneous understanding
elides the passage of time-between the murder and the morning after (in
1975), and between the time when Skakel uttered these words (in 1997) and
the time that they were replayed at the trial itself (in 2002). Distance in time
and space matters not, for everything takes place in the emotionally salient, tem-
porally flattened now of viewing the screen. And because this understanding is
immediate, credible, and seemingly complete, the viewer experiences little rea-
son to question what he or she knows. The defense counsel's purely verbal coun-
ter-narrative is unlikely to explain Skakel's panic as convincingly, because it lacks
the cognitive and emotional salience of the prosecution's montage [Connecticut v.
Skakel 2003:601. Seeing is believing-or more precisely, belief is more solidly con-
structed through visual understanding prompted by visual displays.
We have discussed how, as a function of brain physiology and sensory percep-
tion, people construct their worlds-both their inner worlds and what they
encode about the world outside. We have also noted that visual perception
and visual thinking do not occur in a vacuum, separated from other parts of men-
tal life. Traditionally, pictures used in law have been conceived as mere illustra-
tions of words. A more sophisticated approach will better inform advocates'
choices about what and how much to show, and what and how much to tell.
The conjunctions between pictures and other forms of communication and
between visual and verbal thinking, however, also make it important to under-
stand a little more about the various cognitive and narrative frameworks that
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2. Cognitive Frameworks and Narrative Theory
People's beliefs and judgments may be more or less firmly tethered to perceived
reality, but they always exceed it. To understand a conversation, to make a
prediction, or to assign blame, people always do just what they do in response
to pictures-they "go beyond the information given," in Jerome Bruner's famous
phrase [Bruner 1973]. That is, they interpret and draw inferences from new data
in the light of their habits of thinking and feeling, their largely intuitive concep-
tions of how the world works and how things go.
Cognitive and social psychology help to identify and explain the stuff from
which beliefs are made. Psychology outlines the stereotypes people use to clas-
sify and judge others; it uncovers the stock scripts that guide expectations about
others' behavior and tag deviations as worth accounting for [Bruner 1990; Schank
and Abelson 1977). It describes how everyday cognition conserves scarce mental
resources by using mental heuristics or rules of thumb to reach quick answers
that are often good enough, but sometimes seriously mistaken [Geigerenzer,
Todd, and The ABC Research Group 1999; Gilovich 1991; Nisbett and Ross
1980]. Psychology also shows how people's emotions, while highly variable
and seemingly irreducible to any empirical calculus, interact with their percep-
tions and cognitions to guide judgment and behavior [Damasio 1994; Forgas
1991, 2000]. Other disciplines also strive to articulate the unspoken grounds of
comprehension and belief. Studies in the philosophy of language, linguistics,
and cultural anthropology, for instance, indicate the implicit understandings that
peoplemust share in order to make sense of one another's words [Holland and
Quinn 1987; Lakoff 1987].
Of the manifold ways in which humans organize and make sense of their
experiences, none may be more important than narrative. "It seems almost as
if humankind is unable to get on without stories," write Anthony Amsterdam
and Jerome Bruner toward the beginning of their masterly discussion of the sub-
ject [Amsterdam and Bruner 2000: 114J.Stories do much more than tell what hap-
pened, although that in itself is no small thing. They "give comfort, inspire,
provide insight; they forewarn, betray, reveal, legitimize, convince. You can
declare your love by telling just the right story at the right time; you can be Lago
and create mad suspicion; you can spur Billy Budd to strike Claggart dead"
[Amsterdam and Bruner 2000: 115]. A culture's stories-recounted in religious
scripture and popular novels, depicted in movies and on television, or enacted
in video and computer games-present heroes, villains, and everyone in between
confronting conflicts and one other, and thereby teaching us, the audience, how
we should feel and what we should do about our own and others' comparable
plights.' ~c.':" " .•
Lawyers and law are, of course, immersed in stories, from the client's first
account of events in the lawyer's office to the versions the lawyers tell each other
during settlement negotiations, to the narratives constructed for judge and jury at
the trial, to the accounts designed for television news and journalists in other
mass media. Each telling is molded as much by perceived audience expectations,
conventions of genre and professional practice, and constraints of time and
medium as by correspondence to any unnarrated reality. A persuasive legal story
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must be as consistent as possible, not only with the evidence and the judge and
jury's understandings of the relevant law, but also with those audiences' senses,
developed through lifetimes of exposure to their culture, of "how stories like that
go" [Pennington and Hastie 1993J.
It is the choice of a particular story (and the mode of telling) as befits the cir-
cumstances that tends to capture legal belief and motivate audiences to take the
action the advocate desires: acquit or convict, award damages or deny recovery.
The story that works best may be as relatively mundane as a personal injury law-
yer's allusion to Rocky [United Artists 1976] to depict an accident victim strug-
gling to overcome his undeserved suffering [Feigenson 1995: 61]. Or it may be
as transcendent as the story of the founders of the American polity, used by
Gerry Spence to cast his white separatist client Randy Weaver as the heroic
defender of Jeffersonian liberty against governmental tyranny [Sherwin 2000:
56-58; Spence 1995: 1-48].
Or, drawing once again from one of the case examples offered earlier, consider
the narrative strategy that Maxus's lawyers developed for their case against
Kidder, Peabody and Martin Siegel [Stachenfeld and Nicholson 1996]. The case,
in a nutshell, was that Maxus, a company in the oil business, had hired a pres-
tigious New York investment banker, Martin Siegel, and his finn, Kidder,
Peabody, to prepare the takeover of Natomas, another company. But after each
meeting Siegel held with Maxus officials, the price of Natomas's shares went up.
Maxus claimed that Siegel had passed along inside information to a Kidder execu-
tive, Ivan Boesky, who then invested in the target company, driving up its stock
prices, with the result that when Maxus eventually acquired Natomas it had to
pay hundreds of millions of dollars more than it otherwise would have done.
How to invoke the audience's intuitive beliefs so as to convert such a complex com-
mercial dispute involving massive amounts of circumstantial evidence into a simple,
credible, compelling storyline that would point the jury to the desired verdict?
The solution was to emplot visually the case as a struggle between us and them,
the familiar local guy versus the big bad other-an archetypal conception of how
conflict is structured, and who should win, that goes back to the biblical tale of
David and Goliath, if not to the Zoroastrian God and Satan (Ahura Mazda and
Ahriman). Maxus's closing argument video starts by locating the parties on a
map of the United States. Its disproportionate enlargement of Texas, shaped
and colored to evoke the state's highly popular flag, must have encouraged the
Texan jurors to identify with a home-grown plaintiff and, conversely, drawing
on implicit social stereotypes, to distance themselves from the defendants-those
"outsiders" from New York. To enhance the effect, at one point jurors saw the
state of Texas suddenly snap out of the graphic display as if it were shooting a
line (or a lasso?) around New York IStachenfeld and Nicholson 1996]. In short,
the visual argumen t tha t Maxus's lawyers used to construct the legal conflict
deployed a story frame that anyone familiar with our culture's core moral tales
(or the local culture's implicit folk knowledge) could immediately recognize
and understand. Martin Siegel, the unscrupulous outsider, is recognizably the
"bad guy" in a visually narrated scenario that manifestly prompts the jury's sym-
pathy and animosity along well-established lines .
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3. Mediated Belief: Popular Visual Culture and Reality Judgments
In contemporary culture, most people get their facts primarily from popular vis-
ual media. Television and the Internet provide more people with news about the
world, as well as information about law and politics, than do the more traditional
print media [Shin 2005: this has "continued a 20-year trend in the newspaper
industry, as people increasingly turn to other media, such as the Internet and
24-hour cable news networks, for information"]. Television's photo-realism, in
particular, seems to open an audiovisual "window onto reality" [Potter 1988:
23; Shapiro and MacDonald 1992]. Yet "[tlhe medium is the message," as
Marshall McLuhan famously proclaimed back in 1964 [McLuhan 19641.
Mcl.uhan's critical insight was that we must disabuse ourselves of the naive
notion that the mass media operate like an empty pipe (or, in the case of television,
like a window) through which information passes. In fact, different media exert
different kinds of influence on the messages they convey. For example, print cul-
ture usually operates in a field of concepts and categories. As Walter Ong has
written, "Verbal representation [in the mind] yields associations which indicate
that it is specialized for representing hierarchical conceptual structures" [Ong
1982].Television, by contrast, excels in depicting personal dramas, offering view-
ers storylines and character types that are familiar and immediately accessible.
Television achieves unique emotional power and intimacy by way of the close-
up, which brings viewers directly into the emotional field of the characters on
the screen. (Consider close-ups on smaller television screens, where viewing dis-
tance enhances intimacy.) This is hardly a matter of mere aesthetics. Dramatizing
the personal tends to obscure the general. By presenting social problems in terms
of personal history and individual character development, television resists com-
plexity, which is notoriously difficult to dramatize in visual form [Bennett 1996:
48-58; Postman 1985]. Conversely, print media coverage of social problems can
also tend to oversimplify through dramatization [Stallings 1990:80].
People's media-spawned expectations are guided by the visual codes not only
of television but also of film, especially major Hollywood movies. The visual
codes that come from popular culture become a part of people's visual common-
sense-which is to say, they are unconsciously assimilated. People understand
cross-cutting and parallel editing. They do not need anyone to explain these
storytelling devices. The camera is inside the audience's heads, and they are pre-
pared to reconstruct reality in accordance with the perceptual and cognitive
codes they have internalized.
People also generally suppose that they know reality when they see it, that
they can, by and large, distinguish humbug from the genuine article. They kick
the tires and don't take any wooden nickels. And when people "suspend disbe-
lief" to indulge in a novel, a film, or a television drama, they like to think they do
so "willingly." Yet, considerable psychological research shows that it is not so
easy to know what to believe, or when. Credulity, not skepticism, is the default
mode. When people readily understand something they are inclined to believe it
[Gilbert 1991; 107]. Disbelief must be effortfully engaged; it is what people do
when they assess critically what they have already provisionally accepted as true
[Prentice, Gerrig, and Bailis 1997:416].
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The visual mass media provide people not only with most of their facts but
also with most of their fictions. Indeed, people's world knowledge draws upon
a mixture of fictional and nonfictional sources [Prentice and Gerrig 1999:
529], and they are not always able to differentiate real from fictional sources of
remembered information [johnson and Raye 1981: 67]. The striking irony is that
facts can seem more "factual" the more like fiction they become. This happens
because people generally are less motivated to process fictional information sys-
tematically than factual information [Prentice and Gerrig 1999: 544J. When an
audience unwittingly responds to a factual presentation as if it were fiction,
the default mode---credulity-kicks in. Critical analysis, not disbelief, gets sus-
pended. Effective critique requires not only knowledge of the requisite tools of
critical analysis but also the energy and inclination to undertake it. By contrast,
stored-away fictions effortlessly corne to mind when a familiar narrative genre,
character, or situation type stimulates people's recollection. That is part of what
is going on when a trial lawyer compares a witness or a defendant to a
well-known character from The Godfather, Natural Born Killers, or The Sopranos
[Sherwin 2000: 16-17]. If the comparison sticks, the jury tends to fill in the rest
of the story, including character traits unmentioned at the trial, even if they
are fictional.
The codes and content of modern visual storytelling, from television dramas
and news shows to advertisements and feature films, have infiltrated the court-
room so that fact and fiction, information and entertainment, work hand in hand
in the production of legal truth. For example, consider again in this regard the
closing argument video that was used in a negligence lawsuit against Price
Waterhouse. The video seamlessly shifted from documentary images of the real
Titanic to clips from a British feature film entitled A Night to Remember [1958], in
which we see indifferent officers and a preoccupied captain appear to recklessly
disregard a telegram warning about the presence of icebergs in the ship's
vicinity. (The trial judge's admission of this video was reversed on appeal
[Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse 1989/1996; Sherwin 2000: nn. 39-40;
Sherman 1993: AI].) The upshot is clear: Being the largest in the world is no safe-
guard against negligence.
Or consider again, this time from a popular cultural perspective, the Maxus
insider trading case against Kidder, Peabody. In the visual graphic used by the
plaintiffs in their closing argument, the jurors saw the defendant, Martin Siegel,
perched in a three-by-three grid reminiscent of the tic-rae-toe board featured in
the once-popular television game show, "The Hollywood Squares." When the
nine Siegels are seen and heard simultaneously "taking the Fifth," the effect is
highly comical. The viewer laughs at the incongruous sight of a once-esteemed
Wall Street investment banker cast in a TV game show that typically featured
celebrity has-beens desperate to somehow revitalize their careers (or, at least
make a buck). That this response, and the normative associations that it carries,
is being triggered by an iconic game show, however, remains implicit, unarticu-
Iated, and hence unavailable to critical reflection. The humor on display is dis-
arming, but there is a more serious intent at work here. The visualization of
the incanting Siegel diminishes him by implicitly portraying him as just another
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Siegel ensconced in' all nine squares distracts the decision-maker from a legally
impermissible inference that may also be taking place: namely, the association
of Siegel with other so-called "Fifth Amendment criminals" who hide the truth
of their misdeeds behind a wall of silence: Of course, to say that this apparently
innocuous visual display penalizes the defendant for exercising his constitutional
privilege against compelled self-incrimination not only seems counter-intuitive
from the standpoint of ordinary commonsense (after all, the video clips accu-
rately depict what Siegel said at his deposition), but also spoils the simple fun
of the display: In sum, the viewer gets the message because the visual code of
a popular television game show icon is instantly recognizable, and the critical
bite of an impermissible (albeit unconscious) inference remains hidden, To pre-
serve the joke, the viewer is disinclined to analyze it critically.
To acknowledge that Maxus's "Hollywood Squares" display constructs its vis-
ual argument in the form of a shrewd joke is to reassert one of the points we have
been making: This seemingly simple visual display is decidedly not a mere illus-
tration of ideas that could just as well be expressed verbally. To analyze its rhet-
oric, we have drawn on the' psychology of visual perception, the social
psychology of mental frameworks; narrative theory, and the conflation of fact
and fiction in contemporary culture and the human mind. In the next section
we add one more set of conceptual and rhetorical tools, an essential part of the
multidisciplinary network of insights that lawyers need in order to understand
law in the digital age. 'C, '<.'" "". :",' ,.cc",', • ,
':";':1 . :::_:-..,,;._~,.::_ r. j ,.-""_,, "
. ,".',1."
4, Digital Culture/Digital Mind .'", C "r<';
" v, ~. I-~;~~~~~.\,{-:-r:_ '" , (".~_
Good tools serve the purposes for which they were initially designed, but they
also suggest additional, often unexpected, uses and lead to new forms of under-
standing that inspire the building of yet other tools. Consider, for example, the
computer mouse invented by Douglas Engelbart and his team at the Stanford
Research Institute in California: In 1968, they demonstrated a networked com-
puter system that had the rudiments of two-dimensional display editing, flexible
view control, on-screen: video teleconferencing-and a mouse [http://sloan,
stanford.edu/rnousesite/. last visited July' 6, 2005], Anyone using a computer
now knows how to use a mouse to navigate and enter commands. Forty years
ago, however, these functions were not yet the highly developed technologies
with which we are familiar today. But they projected a vision of human-com-
puter interaction" that inspired innumerable subsequent innovations, from the
graphical user interface (which permits people to use multiple applications at
the same time) to full-fledged hypermedia. Just as those technical ideas were
seeded in a professional community and eventually grew into unexpected, even
astonishing, fruit, exposure to and use of digital technologies is already generat-
ing new behaviors and new patterns of thought in the law.
Advanced digital imaging capacities are now widely dispersed. (Recent
Info Trends/CAP Ventures forecasts show that U.S. consumer digital camera
penetration would 'reach 55 percent and shipments of around 25 million in
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past, a lawyer might order a graphic from a designer and have no real idea of
how it was made. Now that lawyer probably owns a digital camera and can
upload and make simple edits (like cropping or adjusting the orientation or
the contrast between light and dark). The Excel program makes it easy to graph
data; word-processing programs make it easy to design pages and incorporate
pictures and tables into texts. Other readily available software allows people to
layout entire books and create two-dimensional animations. In short, what used
to be the specialized knowledge of graphic designers using tools affordable only
by those with professional commitments is now available to all computer users at
consumer prices for use at home or at work, as freeware, or as software running
on computers in schools, libraries, and copy shops.
The same is true with respect to moving images. Almost anyone can make
them-even still cameras and cell phones are now capable of making short video
clips-and anyone can modify anything they or anyone else has made. Good
hands and expensive tools are no longer needed. Pointing and clicking have
become physical habits; seeing pictures as potential material and not just as
someone's property is one of the new mental habits. Repurposing others' visual
work is not something new. Artists have been quoting each other and learning by
copying from the beginning. Now, however, it can be done with "original" digi-
tal data; anyone, even lawyers, can do it; and their art can be published on the
Internet and disseminated globally at virtually no cost.
The ubiquity of surveillance and amateur video cameras in conjunction with a
broad range of readily available and easy-to-use image-editing tools has given
rise to many more kinds of demonstrative evidence. This was dramatically illu-
strated in the cases arising out of the New York Police Department's mass arrests
of protesters outside the 2004Republican National Convention, in which dozens
of amateur videos were introduced to refute (and, in a few cases, to confirm)
police claims that the protesters had behaved illegally [Dwyer 2005:AI; Medina
and Ho1l2005: B3;on the political dislocations created by ubiquitous photo-ima-
ging in public spaces, see Azoulay 2001: 287}.But the widespread experience of
modifying and manipulating pictures has even deeper cultural and cognitive sig-
nificance. The typical lawyer may not be adept at using advanced professional
editing software like Adobe Photoshop, but in all likelihood he or she will have
heard of "photoshopping" as a verb referring to altering a picture. Today, in an
era when digital pictures are infinitely malleable, when, in the words of William
Mitchell, "the referent has come unstuck" [Mitchell 1994b:31], people may have
to give up their naive sense of the photo-realistic picture as metonymic truth
[Kibbey 2005:12-18]. In exchange, they will gain an understanding of the picture
as a construct, a text to be actively construed rather than a window onto the world
that merely needs to be looked through [Ritchin 1999: 124].
So far we have addressed changes in the pictorial texts themselves. The Inter-
net has also profoundly changed people's relationship to the screen on which
those texts are seen. On cinema screens, people became accustomed to seeing
their dreams writ large while sitting with others in a dark, cavernous room. Tele-
vision, by contrast, with its comparatively small screen, brought news of the
world and entertainment into the intimate sphere of the household, becoming
a character in family life, a familiar. Personal computer screens differ from both.
What Is Visual Knowledge, and What Is It Goodfor? 165
Unlike televisions, where groups' can gather around for a common experience
and comment; personal computers are more often in places where people use
them alone, and their interactions with others are through the machine rather
than across the table or along the couch. However, people also respond to what
they see on screens in many ways that 'are similar to how they respond to social
encounters in real life [Reeves and Nass 1996].'And at the same time, people
expect to do things; to be engaged, with what they see on the screen. (Indeed,
for some the engagement with the machine and the virtual worlds it yields can
become an obsession [Turkle 1995].)
Participating in mediated digital environments is, of course, what computer
gaming is all about: Multiplayer online games such as ;'Second Life" provide
complete social environments for their participants' [Linden Research, Inc.
2003].Successful play, moreover, involves not just interacting with other players
within a framework of rules and protocols, but remaking one's digital world by
reprogramming it. Increasingly, prospective jurors (and not only younger ones)
may come to court with the expectation not only that witnesses and lawyers will
navigate. multiInedia .presentations through pointing and clicking (as in the
Skakel case), but also that they will themselves be allowed to participate in the
recreation of legal reality .• "" . ",
Lawyers are already beginning to cater to people's expectation that, in the digi-
tal era, information is something that they can and should be able to seek out and
interact with; rather than something that they passively receive. Consider the vir-
tual-reality view, a seamless, 360-degree representation of a scene composited
from digital or digitized photographs. Users navigate the scene, moving in any
direction and zooming in or out as desired ..American lawyers have used vir-
tual-reality views in' a handful of cases as illustrative aids to clarify eyewitness
testiInony. In the United Kingdom, an even more complex "virtual-reality sys-
tem" has been used by witnesses before the Bloody Sunday Tribunal, established
in 1998to reexamine the facts of the 1972 killing of 13 Northern Irish citizens by
British soldiers in the' streets of Derry. Interacting with computer-generated-
views of various locations in Derry, witnesses have been able to revisit scenes
from any angle and draw arrows on the screen to describe the events and move-
ments they recalled. In some instances the virtual-reality system has enabled the
Tribunal to confirm that it was physically possible for witnesses to have seen
what they remembered seeing, given the layout of the city and the witnesses'
locations at the time [The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, http://www.bloody-sunday-
inquirv.org.uk]. ':, ;<,C " ...:• "., .; "»
Or consider the Soham double homicide case in England. The defendant stood
accused of, the;' murder of two: young girls Ihttp://news.bbc.co.ukj1jhij
englandj3243025.stm!. The government's case was circumstantial. At its heart
were the sweater fibers from the clothing worn by the two young female victiIns
at the time of their disappearance and death. The jurors not only got to see those
fibers in open court, the judge 'also gave them a DVD to' play during their delib-
erations. (The prosecution teamconsidered 6,820 statements, 7,341 exhibits, and
hundreds of hours of video footage and media coverage. The police enquiry gen-
erated 'approximately 24,000 documents .. [http://www.cps.gov.ukjnewsj
pressreleasesjarchivej139_03.html].) As a result, in the course of reconstructing,
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for themselves the story of the case, the jurors were able to move freely among
the digital evidence contained on the disc, which included images of the fibers,
the sweaters they came from, the crime scene, the girls' route home, videotaped
witness testimony, and other evidentiary material. This kind of free-ranging
interactivity with digital evidence may foreshadow how legal meanings will be
made in the digital era. Lawyers may have to rethink their rhetorical strategies,
making space for their audiences to enter, and allowing them to feel that they
are helping to construct the case along with counsel [Bermant 1999:524;Carring-
ton 1998: 1516).
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGES OF VISUAL KNOWLEDGE
Re-envisioning legal and ethnographic theory in the digital age turns our atten-
tion both to new sources of meaning and to new meaning-making practices.
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, Robert Cover wrote:
We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a world of
right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful .... No set of legal institutionsor prescriptions
exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution
there is an epic, for each Decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed,
but a world in which we live. [Cover1983:4]
Law is a world in which we live. But to live in a nomos, we need a corpus of
inherited texts and a common set of interpretive practices. Out of these materials
and practices we sustain and revise institutions, paradigms for behavior, and pat-
terns of discourse. A stable society agrees upon <atleast to a significant extent),
although not without controversy and debate, a shared repertoire of moves,
"a lexicon of normative action," that it recombines and supplements to meet
the needs of changing times [Rawls 1993: 133-172; Ackerman 1980: 358-359;
Durkheim 1974: 92; Turner 1974:50-56; Cover 1983:9; Jaeger 1939:xiv, xxvi].
The specific challenge that ethnographers and jurists face today is to translate,
under new cultural and technological conditions, the complexity of multidisci-
plinary discourse into forms of rhetoric and practice that are productive and
deemed legitimate within the specific constraints and demands of their respec-
tive professional identities. To accomplish this task we need a rich enough toolkit
for thick cultural description and analysis. That is what a rhetorical-constructivist
approach is intended to offer. From this view, visual ethnography and visual
legal studies involve more than words and sentences, as they also take visual
images, including computer-generated images and simulations, as part of their
subject matter. In addition, they also address the matter of visual literacy, how
the various interpretive tools we use make sense of images in a given context.
In this respect, professionals in both law and ethnography must be able not only
to grasp the components of visual literacy in local settings but also to gain mas-
tery over the various ways in which the visual medium constructs meaning in its
own right. Legal and ethnographic films may at times be connotative in nature in
order to convey the affective and synaesthetic qualities of meaning-making. At
....
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other times, however (for example, in the classroom or when deconstructing a
"flawed" visual document for the benefit of judge or jury inside a courtroom),
legal and ethnographic visual discourse may need to take a denotative turn, shift-
ing voice and genre to suit the need of the moment.
The kind of integration of theory and practice we are recommending has mul-
tiple roots in the scholarly legal culture, including legal realism, legal pragma-
tism, critical legal studies, law and literature, law and norms theory, and the
more recent genre of cultural legal studies [Coombe 1998; Kahn 1999; Post
1991; Sarat and Kearns 1998; Binder and Weisberg 1997: 1149; Silbey 1992: 39;
Symposium 2001: 3]. A common denominator among these diverse approaches
to legal studies is multidisciplinarity. Notably, cultural studies, out of which
the cultural legal studies movement emerged, have been providing scholars out-
side the legal academy with interdisciplinary tools since the late 1970s [Hall 1978;
Williams 19801.Cultural studies focus on the production, circulation, and assimi-
lation of symbolic forms. They are largely concerned with how institutions and
local practices generate social meanings [Turner 1993:411].
Cultural legal studies adopt this focus, seeking to go beyond appellate case
law, statutory interpretation, and social policy, the dominant topics of law teach-
ing and academic writing, in order to encompass legal meaning-making practices
more broadly throughout society [Sherwin 20041.Simply stated, the central ques-
tion that cultural legal studies asks is: What are the popular cultural codes, the
familiar schema; and scripts, the common vocabularies of motive and intention-
ality, and the hierarchy of beliefs and values that are in play within a given site of
legal conflict? 'As Barbara Yngvesson has written, "[tlhe spirit of law isn't just
invented at the top, but is transformed, challenged and reinvented in local prac-
tices that produce a plural legal culture in contemporary America" [Yngvesson
1989: 1689].Whether it is starting rumor campaigns to contest corporate control
over cultural symbols [Coombe 1998], getting a court clerk to admit a story of
abuse as a legal Claim [Yngvesson 1989], or resisting mediators who construct
images of problems in therapeutic as opposed to legal terms [Silbey and Merry
1986:7], these practices at the local level constitute the "microphysics of power"
(to use a I Foucauldian phrase). Cultural legal studies' multidisciplinary
microanalyses of concrete legal practices counterbalance, without eradicating
the need for, critical theory. By proffering localized strategies of rhetorical affir-
mation and, belief, they complement the prevailing ethos of suspicion that
marked (and ultimately undercut) critical legal studies.
The constructivist approach we have presented in this essay extends prior
theory in several directions. First, it invites an even more broadly interdisciplinary
(and thus arguably more fully pragmatic) method. The cluster of conceptual tools
we have discussed 'and applied above is merely illustrative of a much more com-
prehensive lawyer's toolkit, a yet-to-be-written rhetorical handbook for the digital
age. Second,' it expands the search for the constitutive elements of legal conscious-
ness-which'is to say, the cultural materials out of which legal meanings are
shaped, disseminated, and absorbed-to explicitly encompass the quotidian world
of graphic design, film, television, and the Internet, among other digital and multi-
media resources. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it urges the study-from
multiple perspectives and with an eye toward their theoretical, pragmatic, and
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pedagogical ramifications-i-of the manifestations of legal c~n:sc;ousness in the vis-
ual and digital media that have come to pervade the practice of law.
With the ascendancy of electronic monitors inside the courtroom and out, stu-
dents, teachers, and practitioners of law must be able to account for the everyday
associations that decision-makers bring to the screen. They must also be able to
accommodate the familiar cognitive programs and information schemas that
viewers absorb from computers at home and in the office. By the same token,
they will also need to come to grips with changing expectations among
decision-makers who have grown accustomed to surfing screen data for them-
selves. As computer users internalize the thinking tools provided by software
in conjunction with Internet-bred habits of data searching via free association,
adjustments may be needed in legal communication and advocacy. In short, legal
and, we venture to suggest, anthropological training must now adapt to the con-
tingencies of technology and the emerging vernacular of digital culture and the
digital mind [Lessig 1999J.
In our view, retooling the legal and ethnographic mind so that it may be better
adapted to function effectively in a legal (and popular) culture transformed by
new communication technologies constitutes the most pressing challenge before
the academy today. The task is to make sense of the nature and practice of our
respective fields in a nonessentialist, screen-dominated, and pervasively visual
environment. We believe that jurists and ethnographers face similar challenges.
All of us must ask: What kinds of knowledge and meaning are created, and with
what outcomes, when they are visually and digitally constructed in particular
ways? And what are the implications for the search for truth and the perennial
clashes between knowledge and eloquence, rational dialectics and rhetoric, ethi-
cal obligation and aesthetic pleasure (aeslhesis), and belief and disenchantment in
the current digital age?
Meeting the challenges presented by the production, dissemination, and
interpretation of visual knowledge requires a new intellectual framework not
only for law and ethnography but also for the human sciences more generally.
This new framework incorporates both the familiar word-and-text mode of think-
ing as well as the pervasively visual, hyper-mediated, and digital mode that
increasingly characterizes contemporary cultural practices, including the practice
of ethnography and law.
NOTE
1. An earlier version of this essay appeared as "Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Com-
munication Technologies are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law"
in the Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law, 12(2)[2006].
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